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Performance-based funding (PBF) for public colleges and universities is 
increasingly prevalent worldwide, as a part of a broader pattern of 
marketisation in public education. This study focused on developing an 
empirical view of how, and in what contexts, policy makers use the 
concepts of neoliberal economics to design and support Performance-
Based Funding (PBF) policies in higher education. We analysed 121 
policy documents, white papers, evaluation reports, and news items 
related to PBF policies in four case jurisdictions: Tennessee, 
Washington, United Kingdom, and Italy. We employed critical discourse 
analysis methods as framed by Fairclough and colleagues and 
implemented this approach within the broader methodological guidance 
of Carspecken’s critical qualitative research. Grounded in social theory, 
this study illuminates the role PBF policies play internationally in moving 
higher education institutions closer to markets. Moreover, it provides an 
empirical view of the mechanisms and networks built into PBF policy 
debates. Finally, it contributes to a theoretically and empirically 
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Performance-Based Funding (PBF), or the funding of public higher education 
based on institutional outcomes, is increasingly prevalent worldwide. As of 
2016, 32 US states had adopted this type of policy in some form (National 
Conference of State Legislators, 2017), and Performance-Based Funding 
policies are also in place in many European countries (Jongbloed, 2010), 
Australia (Benneworthet et, al., 2011), and Canada (Pakravan, 2006). The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Bank have also promoted similar policies in various Asian and African 
countries (Butler, 2010; Essack, Naidoo and Barnes, 2010; World Bank, 2010; 
Ahmad, Farley and Naidoo, 2012). The American Association of State Colleges 
and Universities (AASCU) included Performance-Based Funding among its top 
ten policy issues for each of the last five years (c.f. AASCU, 2016).  
 
Performance-Based Funding policies create pseudo-markets for public funding 
of higher education within which institutions must then operate (Jongbloed, 
2010; Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012; Letizia, 2015). Questions about the 
desirability of this move toward marketisation rarely play a role in policy 
debates. Instead, the positive potential, or the inevitability, of marketisation is 
often assumed (Ball, 2012; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Prominent 
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critiques have recently emerged, however, highlighting the ways in which 
overemphasis on markets can lead to increasing inequality and instability in the 
broader economy (c.f. Piketty, 2013). Because proponents and critics of PBF 
have linked these policies to the broader pattern of marketisation in public 
education (Ball, 2012; Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012; Letizia, 2015), it is 
important that policy deliberations subject the issue to open and participatory 
public debate.  
 
Understanding the barriers to open debate is a key step toward supporting a 
more participatory and balanced process in guiding future policy in this area. 
From a sociocultural perspective, critical discourse analysis can show why and 
how a policy discussion may include some viewpoints and not others 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). A critical discourse analysis of PBF policies 
could, therefore, contribute to a better understanding of these dynamics, creating 
room in future debates for a more democratic, participatory process.  
 
This critical discourse analysis study focuses on developing an empirical view 
of how, and in what contexts, policy makers use the concepts of neoliberal 
economics to design and support performance-based funding policies in higher 
education. Building on our team’s previous work in a large-scale policy 
inventory of 29 jurisdictions, this paper presents four case studies (two US 
states, Tennessee and Washington, plus the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy) 
and addresses the following research question: 
 
● To what extent, if at all, are neoliberal concepts present in the discourse 
surrounding performance-based funding of higher education in different 
jurisdictions? If present, how and in what contexts do discourse participants use 
these concepts? 
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Theoretical Framework and Literature 
Dougherty and Natow (2010) and Dougherty and Reddy (2011; 2013) have 
noted that the most prevalent theory of action implicit in PBF policy discussions 
assumes that PBF models incentivise institutions to adopt behaviors that will 
result in higher student achievement or other desired institutional outcomes. 
This logic model is more focused upon the steps leading from funding to 
institutional practice and less on how the institutional changes actually lead to 
improved outcomes; this model sidesteps the inherent complexity of improving 
student outcomes and frames the problem, mainly, as a matter of influencing 
institutional aims and priorities via incentives. This mismatch between the logic 
model and the mechanisms of improving student outcomes “on the ground” can 
be further examined by exploring the role of neoliberalism in PBF policies.  
 
The logic model Dougherty and colleagues cite relies on ‘‘incentivising’’ and 
‘‘performativity’’ (defining success by establishing standardised measures). 
These are two principal concepts also at the core of neoliberal policy (Ball, 
2012), especially when the performance measures are market-oriented (i.e. 
workforce development, public-private collaborations and external funding). 
Arguably, the impulse to incentivise higher education institutions (HEIs) to 
improve student outcomes via PBF is actually an example of looking to the 
market as the solution to whatever problems arise; a strategy that is essentially 
at the core of the neoliberal policy agenda (Santos, 2006; Mudge, 2008; 
Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). 
 
Extending this observation, we draw on theoretical frameworks rooted in the 
critique of neoliberalism to frame our analyses. Like Slaughter and Cantwell 
(2012), we base our analyses on the assumption that neoliberal economics form 
an underlying structure for the emerging changes in the funding of higher 
education institutions, as well as for the broader discourse surrounding 
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institutional accountability. For our analysis of PBF policies, however, we 
approached the role of neoliberal concepts (i.e. their presence, importance, and 
use) as an open question, not assuming, but rather questioning whether and how 
these concepts have been used in the policy discourse. 
 
Framing Neoliberal Policy 
Neoliberal economics has dominated global policy discourse in the last three 
decades or more (Chang, 2003; Peck, 2010; Venugopal, 2015). Defining 
neoliberal policy is a complex undertaking, but prevalent themes include 
globalisation/mobility; human capital frames; lifelong learning; marketisation of 
education; and general orientation toward markets as the solution for policy 
problems (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012). One important characteristic of 
neoliberal globalisation has been its hegemony; the fact that it has become so 
prevalent as to take on the status of common sense (Ball, 2012; Peck, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, we, as researchers and stakeholders, should not assume this is the 
only, or natural, way forward. While neoliberal economic theory provides a 
pervasive context underlying current education policy internationally, in the 
case of PBF policy, it is possible that neoliberalism is mixed with other 
concepts or used in evolving ways. Our analyses provide case studies on how 
policy makers and institutional leaders use these concepts in framing, describing 
and navigating current PBF policies. In this way, our paper contributes to an 
empirical basis from which to explore questions related to what comes next for 
higher education. This is the kind of research that Slaughter, and Cantwell 
called for, in describing analysis of discourse and social technologies as a 
‘‘powerful lens for understanding” neoliberal public policy in higher education 
(2012, p. 587). 
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Drawing from the wider literature on neoliberalism, we focus on Mudge (2008) 
and Santos (2006) to frame our study. Mudge (2008) forwards a nuanced 
historical view of neoliberalism that captures three faces of this phenomenon: 
the political, bureaucratic, and academic fields. The political network that 
supports the wide transnational use of neoliberal concepts and the historical 
background of the academic field provide important context for understanding 
the complexity and contradictions inherent in the policies (bureaucratic field). 
More precisely, in Mudge’s view, neoliberal policies entail among others: the 
privatisation of public institutions and resources; deregulation of markets; and a 
reliance on free markets to stabilise the economy. While Mudge theorises how 
neoliberalism works in its social context, we turn to Santos’ (2006) alternative 
vision of accountability in higher education, one based on democratic 
accountability to communities, and centered on sustainability and contribution 
to the public good, instead of to the market.  
 
Santos (2006) outlines a “crisis of legitimacy” defining the role of the university 
through most of the twentieth century and into the present day. This ‘‘crisis of 
legitimacy’’ was created by a contradiction in the central purpose of 
universities: On the one hand, universities “elevated specialized knowledge 
through restrictions of access and credentialing of competencies;” on the other, 
universities met with “social and political demands for a democratized 
university and equal opportunity” (Santos, 2006, p. 61).  
 
Santos’s essay is not an exercise in nostalgia, longing for the days before the 
‘‘crisis of legitimacy’’. Instead, the purpose of his essay is to describe how 
universities gain legitimacy from us, as participants in the public sphere. To 
gain legitimacy in society, Santos recommends universities emphasise the 
following: 1) working for equity in access, retention, and outcomes, and 
addressing stratification of opportunity; 2) actively participating in service to 
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communities and in the “construction of social cohesion, [. . .]  and the defense 
of cultural diversity” (Santos, 2006, p. 86); 3) conducting participatory action 
research in service to communities; 4) the incorporation of knowledge from 
communities into universities; and 5) direct collaborations to improve practice 
and conditions in public schooling. Santos offers these priorities as a direct 
alternative to universities’ legitimation solely through service to - and 
competition in - commercial markets.  
 
In contrast, neoliberal policies may erode and detract resources away from 
institutional efforts to promote equity, ecologies of knowledge, and so on. 
Santos observes, furthermore, ‘‘It is crucial that ‘opening to the outside’ not be 
limited to opening to the market’’ (2006, p. 90). If universities ally themselves 
with dominant groups’ interests alone, he notes, this will in many cases signify 
‘‘illegitimacy and irresponsibility in relation to subaltern interests and social 
groups’’ (2006, p. 90). 
 
Santos’ (2006) model and Mudge’s (2008) framework guided us in forming 
interpretations and subsequent implications for policy and practice. To guide 
our analyses at a more detailed level, we considered how neoliberal policies 
were described in the wider literature.  
 
What are neoliberal concepts? 
Economists, critics, and theorists, focused on neoliberal politics, consistently 
identify a set of concepts at the core of neoliberal economics, such as 
competition, privatisation (i.e., external revenues for public institutions, private 
partnerships, patents), involvement of intermediating organisations, emphasis 
on human capital, and international economic competitiveness, as key 
components of neoliberal policy frames (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012). The 
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social networks surrounding the adoption and use of neoliberal economics are 
complex.  
 
Mudge (2008) has noted that the most effective advocates for neoliberal policies 
in Europe have come from the political left and center-left, a counterintuitive 
point in some contexts, given that in the US, neoliberalism was historically 
adopted mostly by neoconservatives. Several commentators have observed, 
moreover, that promotion of neoliberal performance management in HEIs has 
come not just from external pressures, but from within institutions as well 
(Singh, Kenway and Apple, 2005; Santos, 2006). Slaughter and Cantwell (2012) 
noted that institutions are not simply buffeted by changes and forces imposed 
from the outside, but that institutions and actors within them also have 
participated in bringing universities closer to markets. They cite the Bayh-Dole 
Act (1980), which guarantees for instance the funding of US universities patents 
and intellectual property rights for work by federal research grants and 
contracts. They summarise further examples noting that prevalent internal 
discourses and structures emphasise: ‘‘competition for external resources, 
cooperation with industry, attainment of bench marks, and success in rankings’’ 
(Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012, p. 593). Further efforts often take the form of 
‘interstitial organizations’, such as incubators, technology transfer centers, and 
research centers. 
 
Others have similarly pointed to new management styles (Santos, 2006; Feller, 
2009; Ball, 2012), and themes of human capital and workforce development 
(Santos, 2006; Ball, 2012). The imposition of standardised measures in order to 
define success and facilitate comparison and competition across institutions and 
sectors, a practice Ball (2012) terms ‘‘performativity’’, is also present within 
postsecondary education policy (Feller, 2009; Singh et al., 2005). Finally, 
scholars have consistently pointed to the central theme of ‘desacralising’ 
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formerly protected sectors (i.e. education and healthcare) by making them 
subject to markets (Mudge, 2008), privatisation (Mudge, 2008; Lincove, 2009) 
and the reliance on global markets for regulating the economy and as a solution 
to problems as they arise (Singh et al., 2005; Santos, 2006; Mudge, 2008; 
Lincove, 2009; Ball, 2012).  
 
Underscoring the above idea, Ball summarises “The point is to make ‘the 
market’ the obvious solution to social and economic problems’’ (2012, p. 26). 
Related to this last point, Santos (2006) noted that the state and public 
institutions are placed in the service of the market, leading to the creation of 
quasi-markets for public institutions to operate in, and reducing public financial 
support of education. This pattern shows in an emphasis on accountability and 
efficiency. Santos notes, in particular, ‘‘the [neoliberal] project is linked but not 
limited to the reduction in public funding’’ (2006, p. 67). In some sense, this 
approach removes policy makers and administrators from the need to have 
underlying core values about the purpose of higher education. Instead, the logic 
holds, the market will decide.  
 
This study is an instance of what Singh and colleagues (2005) have called 
researching “globalization from below.” That is, rather than reviewing broad 
patterns of neoliberal globalisation, we explore how neoliberal policies work on 
the ground, through the discourse used by participating individuals and 
institutions. Specifically, we aim to understand how policy makers and 
institutions, in four case jurisdictions, use and enact neoliberal ideas through 
PBF policies. Describing research on globalisation from below, Singh et al., 
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‘‘One focus in this research [research on globalization from below] is on the extent to 
which and manner in which globalizing processes are mediated on the ground.[ . . .] 
Attention is paid to diverse peoples and places, and their complex and contradictory 
experiences of, reactions to, and engagements with various aspects of globalization as 
these intersect with their lives and identities over time’’. (2008, p. 8) 
 
Following this line of inquiry, we have collected data in the form of policy 
documents, advocacy documents, evaluation reports and social media activity 
surrounding four different policies enacting performance-based funding of 
higher education institutions (c.f. Table 1).We analysed these as constituent of 
the discourse surrounding PBF, and as documentation of how participants in 
this discourse (policy makers, institutions, advocates, and researchers) make 
sense of and use the concepts implied by neoliberal economics. We analysed 
these documents, in part, using a list of concepts associated with neoliberalism, 
synthesised from the authors cited above (c.f. Table 2). 
 
Methods 
In this article, we present a critical discourse analysis study of policy 
documents, white papers, evaluation reports, and news items related to PBF 
policies in four case jurisdictions. We employed critical discourse analysis 
methods as framed by Fairclough and colleagues (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 
1999; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) and implemented this approach within 
the broader methodological guidance of Carspecken’s critical ethnography 
(1996) in order to develop four case studies (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2013). We 
defined Performance-Based Funding as any policy entailing the public funding 
of higher education institutions based on institutional outcomes (i.e. student 
completions and research productivity). 
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Yin (2013) proposes the replication of studies rather than sampling logic as the 
more suitable model for guiding case selection. In following this guidance, we 
looked for cases that would have some similarities across contexts, and some 
differences. After conducting a policy inventory and review of literature for the 
larger study of 29 individual states and countries, we selected two case 
jurisdictions in the EU (considering a study period of 2008-2016) and two in the 
US.  
 
More precisely, we selected the UK and Italy as case studies to represent 
different conditions within Europe; considering region, population size, 
economic conditions, and history of reforms in the higher education sector 
during this process. We also included Tennessee and Washington as additional 
cases because they introduce further variation in terms of national, economic, 
and policy contexts for reform. Tennessee has the longest history of extensive 
activity related to performance funding and is seen as a model in national 
discussions of PBF. In contrast, Washington has a relatively brief history with 
PBF, but is also the site of an innovative funding model emphasising 
intermediate student outcomes at the state’s community colleges (i.e. student 
gains in basic skills and credit completions). 
 
Our purpose in this article is to shed light on policy makers’ use of neoliberal 
concepts in four jurisdictions. In presenting the four case studies, we are able to 
forward some observations about the discourse in each of these contexts. 
However, we do not attempt to draw causal conclusions regarding differences 
and regularities observed across the cases, or to make systematic comparisons 
on specific variables. We believe that the four case summaries and discussion 
highlight important themes, showing both similarities and differences across the 
selected jurisdictions, but our aim is to describe how policy makers use 
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neoliberal concepts across various contexts, in a way that does not abstract, 
collapse, or prematurely boil down the complexity of the policy contexts.  
The use of Yin’s logic of replication of studies, rather than the sampling logic, 
in selecting cases had further implications on the structure and presentation of 
our results. Because the four jurisdictions constitute individual, complex, 
situated cases, the summary of findings from each jurisdiction lent itself more 
clearly to a case-by-case presentation rather than a thematic structure, whereby 
examples of a given theme are presented drawing from across the case 
jurisdictions.  
 
The themes played out differently in each jurisdiction and were conditioned by 
complex variation in contexts. For these reasons, we felt we could best preserve 
the complexity of the cases in our construction of findings by discussing each 
jurisdiction separately. Finally, our discussion section returns to the theoretical 
framework to highlight conclusions that are illuminated by the multi-case 
design. While our goal is not comparison per se, the collection of findings 
across the four jurisdictions is useful in showing some patterns and some range 
of complexity in how policy makers use neoliberal concepts in forming PBF 
policies. Illuminating these patterns and complexities is useful, furthermore, 
because it provides an empirical basis for linking PBF debates to theory and 
research relevant to neoliberalism more broadly.  
 
Data collection centered on both primary and secondary sources for each case, 
discovered using a systematically developed set of keywords, searching selected 
bibliographic databases and targeting news sources. The document data set 
consists of items of four types: 1) primary policy documents (government 
policy documents, government websites, and summaries of policies released by 
government agencies); 2) advocacy documents (white papers, or other examples 
of “policy intermediation” (Peck and Tickell, 2003) released by advocacy 
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organizations); 3) evaluation studies; and 4) news coverage and outreach media 
(news items and advertisements) (c.f. Table 1). Documents were considered 
eligible if they explicitly referred to the specific policy identified for the case 
study: the Complete College Tennessee Act (CCTA) of 2010; Washington state’s 
Student Achievement Initiative (SAI), revised in 2012; the Evaluation of 
Research Quality (Valutazione della Qualità della Ricerca, VQR), program 
implemented in Italy in 2011; and the UK’s Research Excellence Framework 
(REF) instituted in 2014. 
 
Data analysis procedures began with low-inference coding of key documents 
(Carspecken, 1996). In later-stage analysis, we built gradually toward pattern 
coding (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña, 2013) and codes derived from the 
critiques of neoliberalism (i.e. competition, efficiency and privatisation). A 
complete list of codes is included in Table 2. We organised and documented our 
analyses using qualitative data analysis software (ATLAS.ti).  
 
Low-inference coding, qualitative research memos, and a reflexive and 
collaborative approach helped to support the trustworthiness and relevance of 
our analyses. For example, while we felt our later analyses were well supported 
by the gradual and iterative coding process we followed, we grappled at times 
with the application of the critique-of-neoliberalism concepts to each 
jurisdiction’s documents. We also struggled with how best to support the 
trustworthiness of our findings in making choices about how to represent the 
variation and incommensurability that naturally emerges in case studies of this 
kind. In both instances, reflexive research memos and collaborative debriefing 
helped us to challenge ourselves and to stay close to the data.  
 
Our analyses naturally have limitations owing to methodological choices and 
trade-offs we made in conducting the study. The study cannot support causal 
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conclusions regarding why policy makers’ use of neoliberal concepts may differ 
from case to case. Furthermore, the collection of cases cannot be understood as 
neatly or fully representing the broader phenomenon of PBF policy debates as 
they play out globally. The layered complexity of policy contexts and policy 
formation in practice cannot be encapsulated in the four cases described here. 
Nevertheless, we believe it is useful to explore the policy discourse as it played 
out in four purposeful examples, as even this beginning can illuminate some 
patterns and variation in whether and how policy makers use neoliberal 
concepts in defining and explaining PBF.  
 
Case Summaries 
Findings in this study focus on how and in what contexts concepts related to 
marketisation were used in the policy documents. Key background and 
contextual information for each case study is summarised in Table 3. Although 
we discuss themes that emerged across all cases and address key findings, 
similarities, and differences across the jurisdictions in the Discussion section, 
we aim to explore each jurisdiction as a single, self-contained case.  
 
Tennessee 
Tennessee has a long history and high profile of performance-based funding of 
postsecondary education. In 1979, it became the first US state to establish 
Performance-Based Funding for postsecondary education institutions, and 
although the policy has changed over the years, PBF has been continuously in 
place, in some form, since its inception. In the decades since, proponents of 
PBF have pointed to models implemented in Tennessee as exemplars (Complete 
College America (CCA), 2010; Jones, 2011; Wright, 2016).  
 
The legislative language surrounding the CCTA suggests that the state of 
Tennessee sought to stimulate economic and workforce development through 
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incentivising varied outcomes (T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 2010). In the 
CCTA, promotion of economic growth and development was central, and more 
specifically included advancement of research in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, as well as clean energy sciences 
(T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 2010).  
 
Markets, Quasi-Markets, and Competition 
Our thematic analyses of policy, advocacy, and media documents showed that 
policy makers, intermediating organisations, and media reporters used market 
logic in framing and describing the CCTA. For example, the CCTA legislation 
itself includes examples of how policy makers point to incentivising a change in 
institutional priorities to become more attuned to standardised measures of 
quality aligned with the state’s market-oriented, economic development 
priorities. The stated purpose of the policy was identified as establishing “[. . .] 
performance funding policy solutions […] to influence institutional behavior 
and to align campus and public priorities” (T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 
2010, p. 1).  
 
Similarly, news stories highlighted policy makers’ perceptions that performance 
funding is a natural and necessary vehicle to align institutions’ priorities, 
portraying the turn toward markets as natural and inevitable. A 2011 National 
Public Radio story, A Carrot for College Performance, framed the issue by 
saying “Only about half of the students […] will get a degree within six years 
from this school […]. Until now, Tennessee Tech had no financial incentive to 
do anything about that” (Abramson, 2011). The report highlighted this rationale, 
even while also quoting a Tennessee Tech dean as saying: “[…] faculty have 
always talked about ways to help students succeed […]. We have always known 
it was important’’. 
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Passages explicitly referring to markets in the Tennessee case prevalently 
highlighted workforce development for particular energy-related industries. For 
example, one of the CCTA’s enumerated goals was to “accelerate the state's 
economic and workforce development efforts in the field of energy sciences and 
engineering” (T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 2010). In addition, the legislation 
referred to entrepreneurial approaches in general, further identifying the 
promotion of STEM research, “to encourage entrepreneurial opportunities in 
Tennessee” (2010, p. 7).  
 
On a subtler level, Tennessee policy documents and advocacy white papers also 
included repeated references to human capital, presented in the context of 
international economic competitiveness. A Lumina Foundation Report focused 
on Tennessee’s PBF as an exemplar and framed Tennessee’s policy within 
college completion, educational attainment and economic competitiveness, 
prevalent themes in US higher education policy, referring to “widely 
acknowledged […] escalating standards for economic competitiveness” 
(Wright, 2016, p. 1). This thread is worth noting because it appears to ignore 
findings from research suggesting that university efforts to increase human 
capital for economic development are effective only when the targeted 
industries already have a presence in the state (Powers, 2003).  
 
Interestingly, media reports and policy summaries suggested that policy makers 
and institutions in Tennessee were not sparring with each other over the central, 
arguably, market-facing, concepts built into the CCTA policy: incentives tied to 
funding; market-oriented performance measures; and participation in quasi-
markets and privatisation via partnerships and external funding. A 2011 
National Crosstalk article quoted one campus administrator: “we’ve all drunk 
the Kool-Aid” (Jones, 2011, § 48), indicating that these aspects of the CCTA 
were uncontroversial.  
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Controversy did arise, however, between institutions and policy makers over the 
uncertain prospects for growth within the PBF system, or the looming 
alternative of flat or declining funding for higher education overall. This 
broader concern connected to another, secondary discomfort mentioned by 
institutional leaders in the press; a concern about competition for funds built 
into the CCTA policy. While the primary policy documents make only indirect 
mention of competition, the policy is structured in such a way that gains by one 
institution result in losses to others, especially under the scenario of flat funding 
or cuts over time. The same National Crosstalk article, mentioned above, 
quoted a college president, expressing overall support for the policy, but 
highlighting a concern about competition between institutions:  
 
If I have a target of 100 in a certain area and [using the state’s dynamic modeling 
tool] I type in a result of 110, I can see how much we get, and then I can see who’s 
going to be mad at me because I took their money. When someone wins, someone 
else loses.  (Jones, 2011, § 44).  
 
Performativity 
Consistent with the US discourse on college completion in recent years, policy 
and advocacy documents surrounding the CCTA focus on attainment rates and 
national and international economic competitiveness. Almost by definition, the 
standardized measures built into the CCTA articulate targets and definitions for 
success. In the Tennessee policy, performativity is prevalently directed toward 
human capital, i.e. “degree production” (T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 2010, 
p. 2), and workforce development “workforce training contact hours [. . .] job 
placements” (Johnson and Yanagiura, 2016, p. 6), but also “intermediate 
outcomes” (i.e. credit completion and progress through developmental 
coursework) (Johnson and Yanagiura, 2016, p. 6). Evaluation studies have so 
far concluded that, while some evidence of institutions changing their practices 
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after CCTA exists, it is unclear whether the policy can be linked to improved 
student outcomes (Johnson and Yanagiura, 2016). 
 
Partnerships and Privatisation  
Privatisation is most obviously built into the CCTA in that an institution’s 
success in attracting external funding is one of the performance criteria. 
Institutions’ and individuals’ ability to gain external funding is widely viewed 
as a competitive indicator of excellence in the US and an enhancement to an 
institution’s status and reputation (if not to its actual budget), and so this point 
may seem simply intuitive.  
 
Nevertheless, the incremental shift from public to private support of public 
HEIs in the form of external research funding is itself a form of privatisation. 
We note this to assemble a fuller picture of how policy makers use neoliberal 
concepts and goals in the CCTA. Public-private collaboration was likewise 
among the goals outlined for the policy. The CCTA legislation includes the 
following provision, for example:  
 
Recognising the potential leverage and synergy that can be achieved by collaboration 
among the public and private entities, it is hereby declared that the University of 
Memphis, the University of Tennessee Center for the Health Sciences and St. Jude 
Children's Research Hospital are lead collaborators in the Memphis Research 
Consortium. (T.N. Legis. Assemb. HB 7006, 2010, p. 8) 
 
This excerpt from the legislation illustrates that partnerships with private 
entities are highlighted in the policy itself, both generally and in the creation of 
specific collaborations.   
 
The Tennessee case illustrates the subtle dynamics of a mature and participatory 
process, and some of the ways neoliberal concepts are present not only in 
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legislation but internal to institutions as well. Turning to the case of 
Washington, where the PBF policy had a shorter history and affected 




The State Board for Community and Technical Colleges (SBCTC) implemented 
the SAI policy in 2008, after its adoption in 2007. The SAI focuses on student 
gains in basic skills and credit completion, gaining attention in the literature for 
this emphasis (Jenkinset al., 2012; Dougherty et al., 2013; Lumina Foundation, 
2016). In one evaluation study, institutional stakeholders reported feeling the 
SAI reflected support for the success of students from varied backgrounds and 
respect for institutional differences statewide (Jenkins and Shulock, 2013). On 
the other hand, recent analyses have raised questions about whether the policy 
has actually improved student outcomes (Hillman, Tandberg and Fryar, 2015). 
 
Markets, Quasi-Markets, and Competition 
Our analyses showed that primary documents from the Washington SBCTC 
reflect policy makers’ use of the market logic of incentives and rewards in 
framing the SAI. Descriptions of policy documents relevant to the Washington 
SAI emphasised workforce development and economic competitiveness of the 
region. This may seem logical, as workforce development is closely tied to the 
missions of community and technical colleges throughout the US. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that the stated purpose of the initiative was to incentivise 
community colleges to improve student success rates; a market solution 
(incentives) to improve, based on standardised measures defining student 
success (performativity).  
 
Performance-Based Funding of Higher Education 
183 | P a g e   
The SBCTC’s documents frame the policy as incentivising the alignment of 
goals, although, as with Tennessee, improving student outcomes may already 
have been among institutional goals. In addition, the policy included new 
support to institutions in its inaugural year to support improvement efforts. This 
new support was small, however, approximately $500,000 total for 34 colleges, 
and because this was likely not enough financial support to fund new programs 
or efforts, we argue that these funds also functioned mainly as an incentive 
(SBCTC, 2007, p. 2).  
 
SAI policy documents included relatively few references to competition among 
institutions, framing the point system around continuous improvement as 
opposed to zero-sum comparisons across colleges. The SBCTC resolution 
notes, for example, that one of the principles driving the SAI’s use of incentive 
funding is its structure, by which “colleges compete against themselves for 
continuous improvement, rather than competing with each other” (SBCTC, 
2007, Attachment A, p. 3). 
 
In comparison to the Tennessee case, the SAI evaluation studies made only 
intermittent use of the incentivising logic. Jenkins and colleagues (2012) 
identified one of the two goals of the SAI as “to provide incentives to colleges 
[…] for increasing student success’’.  However, evaluations of the SAI also 
raised questions about resources and institutional capacity available to 
significantly improve student success outcomes, thus stepping out of the 
neoliberal framework. The Community College Research Center (CCRC) final 
report, for example, highlights the importance of a cumulative effect, whereby 
financial awards accrue as a stable resource for continued improvements in 
practice (Jenkins, et al., 2012). A 2015 American Educational Research 
Association (AERA) press release highlighted Hillman and colleagues’ (2015) 
Falling Short study, which pointed to the complexities beyond incentivising 
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institutions with financial rewards.  
 
There is no easy solution to improving college performance [said Hillman]. Most 
schools do not have the capacity to make improvements with current resources. That’s 
especially true of community and technical colleges, which are already known for 
having to do the most with the least amount of resources. (AERA, 2015, § 12) 
 
Performativity 
The Washington case illustrates a participatory process with an emphasis on 
intermediate outcomes (i.e. credits completed and first college-level credit). 
These are distinguishing features of PBF in Washington, and evaluation studies 
have attributed the sustainability of the policy to these steps (Shulock and 
Jenkins, 2011). However, they in themselves are not inconsistent with 
neoliberal policy.  
 
Focusing on participatory process, Jenkins and Shulock’s evaluation study of 
the SAI (2013) shared lessons learned from its development and 
implementation. Following collection and analysis of interview data, they 
concluded that college leaders generally supported the metrics built into the 
initiative’s funding model. However, these stakeholders also perceived a lack of 
transparency within the complex model, inhibiting their ability to see why an 
institution’s performance had improved, making it difficult to identify new 
ways to improve. Furthermore, the authors reported that some college leaders 
felt too much funding tied to student outcomes could potentially destabilise 
institutions. While Jenkins and Shulock’s results (2013) suggested that inclusion 
of varied stakeholders, open communication, and regular evaluation were 
instrumental to the program’s successful implementation, Dougherty, Natow 
and Vega (2012) cited participating institutional leaders’ perception that the  
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performance funding system was not wholly responsive to diverse institutional 
missions. 
 
Another CCRC evaluation study revealed evidence of dissonance between 
Washington’s SAI measures and their targeted student outcomes (Jenkins and 
Shulock, 2013). Analyses showed, for example, that even when colleges’ 
points, under the SAI rating system, increased, overall student progression did 
not improve; a finding that calls into question the validity and implementation 
of the performance measures themselves.  
 
Research has shown scarce evidence that PBF policies result in improved 
student outcomes in US HEIs (Hillman et al., 2015). This may be because 
longer time frames are needed before effects can be observed (Tandberg, 
Hillman and Barakat, 2014), or it may on the other hand further bear out the 
view that the problem of student success is more complex than market solutions 
can necessarily solve.  
 
There are additional disadvantages and advantages to consider with regard to 
performativity in Washington. One disadvantage is that workforce development 
needs of certain industries are foregrounded, prioritizing those industries’ 
human capital needs. At the same time, accountability for equity and service to 
communities were backgrounded, and, in fact, not mentioned in primary policy 
documents. One advantage, however, is that equity was part of the discourse 
surrounding the SAI; evaluation studies and media reports focused on the 
potential danger of unintended consequences of the policy. Shulock and 
Jenkins’ policy brief, for example, asked, “How can performance funding 
systems best provide incentives for colleges to serve underprepared students?” 
(2001, p. 15). 
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Next, the SAI’s orientation toward intermediate outcomes is an important 
dimension of performativity in Washington. As mentioned previously, the 
state’s use of intermediate outcomes as measures of performance are considered 
particularly innovative and influential within the Performance Funding 2.0 
generation of new policies (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013; Jenkins and Shulock, 
2013). Incentivising intermediate outcomes, such as gains in basic math and 
writing skills, has gained support from stakeholders for several reasons. Study 
participants averred that rewarding a diverse range of achievements had allowed 
for the progress of students from disadvantaged backgrounds to be valued more 
equitably, acknowledging that degree completion is more likely for students 
from more privileged backgrounds (Jenkins and Shulock, 2013). Additionally, 
stakeholders viewed policies that considered student background in 
measurement of performance to be supportive of community colleges as 
institutions, highlighting the relevance of intermediate outcomes as useful 
measures across diverse institutional types.  
 
Partnerships and Privatisation 
The SBCTC resolution includes collaboration among the goals for the SAI. The 
board’s third principal objective for the next ten years was to “use technology, 
collaboration and innovation to meet the demands of the economy and improve 
student success” (SBCTC, 2007, p.A1). Nevertheless, public-private 
partnerships and privatisation were not a prevalent theme in either the policy 
documents or the media coverage related to the SAI. However, the case of 
Washington does illustrate the role of foundations and other agenda-setting 
organisations in the discourse surrounding performance-based funding in the 
US. The Gates Foundation, for example, funded the initial development of the 
SAI in 2006 and a three-year evaluation study of the policy conducted by the 
Community College Research Center (CCRC) at Teachers College (Long, 
2015). The SAI is among the policies highlighted in the Lumina Foundation for 
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Education FAQ website explaining the benefits of outcomes-based funding 
(Lumina, 2016).  
 
Washington’s SAI policy shows a contrasting example in which incentivising 
logic is used somewhat intermittently, and where policy intermediating 
organizations are a prominent voice. Articulated goals focus on human capital 
and economic development, but equity concerns seemed to remain a part of the 
discussion at some level. 
 
United Kingdom 
While higher education policy is differentiated in the UK across national 
contexts and institutional types, HEIs are generally funded based on a 
combination of enrollment and results of regular research assessment exercises, 
now framed under the Research Excellence Framework (REF) policy. The UK 
employs centralised evaluation of institutional performance focused on multiple 
indicators including access, completion rates, student learning outcomes, 
graduate workforce outcomes and research productivity (Jongbloed, 2010). 
However, the REF policy is the main vehicle of performance-based funding in 
the system.  
 
The majority of the 163 higher education institutions in the UK are non-profit 
organisations and receive substantial public funding. However, Geuna and 
Piolatto have characterised the UK as a ‘‘competitive system” (20015, p. 41), 
tying approximately half of total university funds to private funding. Although 
the UK’s first experience with systematic assessment of research was in 1986, 
the current REF system was instituted in 2014 by the four UK coordinating 
boards for tertiary education: Higher Education Funding Commissions for 
England (HEFCE) and Wales (HEFCW); the Scottish Funding Council (SFC); 
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and the Department of Employment and Learning (DEL) for Northern Ireland 
(Geuna and Piolatto, 2015). 
 
Although responsiveness to national needs is expressed differently in Wales, 
Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England, there appears to be a concentrated 
effort across the UK to increase efficiency and achieve “better value-for-money 
from the higher education sector” (Middlehurst, 2013, p. 278). HEIs in the UK 
face pressure to be internationally competitive in research, faculty and student 
recruitment, and programming and services (Middlehurst, 2013). This context 
has naturally shaped discussion around REF performance indicators and has 
become embodied in the general concept of ‘impact’. 
 
Markets, Quasi-Markets and Competition 
The policy discourse surrounding the REFincluded specific references to 
incentivizing HEIs to align their goals with those of the state and to improve 
their performance in producing research.These were presented as the aims of the 
policy in the following quote, for example:  
 
We have taken into account the UK Government’s aims for the publicly funded 
research sector and its expectations as to the role that the REF should play in 
delivering these. The Government has made plain its view that maintaining the 
capacity of the HE sector to produce world-leading research across a broad range of 
academic disciplines is essential to underpin economic growth and national well-
being; and that to this end the HE sector can and should do more to ensure that its 
excellent research achieves its full potential impact. (HEFCE, 2009, p. 4) 
 
This excerpt illustrates the policy makers’ use of the typical logic model for 
PBF, stating explicitly that HEIs can and should contribute more to the 
economy (‘‘economic growth and national wellbeing’’). According to this and 
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other similar examples, only the will is missing; thus, incentivising HEIs with 
the REF is posed as the natural solution. 
 
Performativity 
In the main document for the second consultation process defining the REF, 
HEFCE, HEFCW, SFC and DEL quoted directives from the Secretary of State 
for Education, noting that the REF “should take better account of the impact 
research makes on the economy and society” (HEFCE, 2009, p. 4). This 
orientation of performativity toward ‘impact,’ i.e., defining success in part by 
contribution to “the economy and society,” became a central and controversial 
feature of the REF. Moreover, the funding agencies noted the relevance of 
international competitiveness, and identified contributions to both the economy 
and national wellbeing as the measure of ‘impact.’ 
 
The UK funding bodies each aim to develop and sustain a dynamic and 
internationally competitive research sector in their country or territory that makes a 
major contribution to economic prosperity, national wellbeing and the expansion and 
dissemination of knowledge. Research assessment is a key means through which we 
pursue this strategic aim. (HEFCE, 2009, p. 5) 
 
Partnerships and Privatisation 
The discourse surrounding the REF is characterised by high-volume exchanges 
in social media outlets, such as Twitter, where #REF2014 is an active hashtag, 
blogs (i.e. wonkhe.com; the London School of Economics “Impact of Social 
Science”), and in reports released both by institutions and a growing 
consultancy sector (i.e. “Fast Track Impact”). Debates about the appropriateness 
and fairness of the impact assessments abound in these forums, as does 
discussion of strategies for planning for and increasing the impact of ‘outputs,’ 
as counted under the policy. Our analyses revealed that institutions and 
university-affiliated researchers affected by the policy were active participants 
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in these exchanges, although consultants and firms offering services were also 
prevalent. Critics highlighted questions about the assessment of impact under 
REF, wherein impact is generally defined as social, economic, or cultural 
contribution or influence outside of the academy. One common critique noted, 
for example, that prioritising economic impact of publicly funded research (a 
concept associated with neoliberalism) effectively devalues scholarship in the 
arts and humanities (Shepherd, 2009).  
 
Another aspect of privatisation shown in REF policy documents pertained to an 
ancillary goal of encouraging university researchers to move across public and 
private sectors. During the second consultation, for example, policy makers 
outlined the issue as follows:  
 
Significant benefits can flow from the movement of researchers between HE and other 
sectors, including business and industry and the public and voluntary sectors …Its 
benefits can include the achievement of more frequent and more significant outcomes, 
harnessing research findings to real world problems, and the development of a culture 
within HE that values and supports interactions of all kinds. Encouraging researcher 
mobility is a specific policy aim of the REF and we wish to ensure that the framework 
creates a positive environment for researcher mobility. (HEFCE, 2009, p. 24) 
 
This excerpt illustrates the importance REF policy makers assigned to public-
private partnership in addition to the orientation of publicly funded research and 
higher education toward the private sector. Both of these concepts are forms of 
privatisation and are among the concepts regularly identified with neoliberal 
policy.  
 
Patterns within the UK case seem to illustrate Feller’s point (2009), showing 
how various forms of privatisation (i.e. consulting, infrastructure, relying more 
on tuition and emphasising impact) are being pursued and implemented not 
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solely from external pressure, but from within institutions as well. News and 
media sources included regular participation by institutions touting their results 
as a vehicle for enhancing their reputations (c.f. East Anglian Daily Times, 
2014; Chaudhari, 2017). Moreover, consultants’ posts were prevalent, 
recommending strategies for individual researchers, programs, and institutions; 
advice about how they might document and expand their impact as defined in 
the REF. In this way, by 2016, the collected news and media documents for the 
UK case reflected a high-level of buy-in among HEIs overall, at least as seen in 
social media.  
 
                
 
  Figure 2. Excerpt from Twitter Feed on #REF2014 
The discourse surrounding the REF highlights several important themes, 
particularly regarding the various forms of privatisation, and the ways in which 
neoliberal concepts were sometimes used within and by institutions as well as 
by external policy makers. 
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Italy 
In the case of Italy’s VQR policy, we saw language foregrounding: 1) a division 
between policy makers and academics regarding the desirability of marketising 
tertiary education; 2) performativity organised around “international standards,” 
which are referenced frequently; and 3) external funding via partnerships with 
private organisations and patents. This last aspect, arguably a form of 
privatisation, is the focus of the so-called “third mission” built into the policy 
(VQR, 2010). Interestingly, Italy’s case also offers examples of how 
performativity can reinforce the legitimation of public funding going to private 
entities. These patterns will become clearer as we discuss our three topical 
themes below.  
 
Markets, Quasi-Markets, and Competition 
Our thematic analyses revealed that the marketisation of higher education was 
widely portrayed as inevitable in Europe-wide policy intermediation documents. 
In 2010, for example, the European Centre for Strategic Management of 
Universities (ESMU) wrote:  
 
“All across Europe, government still is the main funding source for higher education 
institutions. At the same time, it is widely recognised that securing alternative, private 
revenue sources will be necessary in the years ahead”. (Jongbloed, 2010, p. 9) 
 
This reflects a common theme found in several reports and documents produced 
by the European Commission (EC) and Brussels think tanks, especially in 
earlier documents included in the study (i.e., those from 2005 to 2010). The 
same ESMU report included the following summary, further illustrating this 
position:  
 
A mass higher education system requires a greater reliance on markets and their 
decentralised decision-making by individuals and institutions […]. In the words of 
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Nicholas Barr: ‘‘The days of central planning are gone! (Barr, 2003)”.  (Jongbloed, 
2010, p. 31) 
 
Policy intermediating organisations, including the OECD, the Nordic Institute 
for Studies in Innovation, Research, and Education (NIFU), the Center for 
Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), and ESMU, consistently associated 
PBF policies, described as market-based strategies, with progress itself, and 
with the necessity of modernising European tertiary education. In one example, 
a 2010 CHEPS report on PBF policies in Europe centered in part on the 
question: “what could be the further courses for action towards the 
modernisation of higher education institutions towards 2020?” (de Boeret al., 
2010, p. 2). 
 
In 2015, however, a report released by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) (as the 
EC’s science agency), urged “reconsidering […] the emphasis on competitive 
funding for R&I excellence,” (Nascia and Pianta, 2015), especially with regard 
to Italy. This is a particularly interesting development that warrants further 
discussion. Although the EC was a strong proponent of PBF and other market-
based competitive approaches to funding research (and eventually tertiary 
education overall) through the first decade of the century, more recently their 
agencies have begun to acknowledge that some barriers may exist that market-
solutions are ill-suited to address. These include under-resourced universities, 
funding inequalities defined by region and institution type, and a brain drain 
problem for the country (Nascia and Pianta, 2015).  
 
Problems with marketisation were likely more visible from within the 
institutions, which may explain in part how institutional buy-in has unfolded 
differently in Italy, as compared to our other three cases. Researchers at several 
universities notably boycotted the process, and in at least one case at the 
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University of Salerno, the rector submitted materials for the boycotting 
researchers without their participation or permission (Giordano, 2014; 2016; 
Baccini and De Nicolao, 2016). 
 
Performativity 
The legislation establishing the Agenzia Nazionale di Valutazione del Sistema 
Universitario e della Ricerca (ANVUR), an external organisation founded in 
2010 specifically to manage the VQR, specifies that a principal goal of the 
agency will be to “evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of public financing 
programs and incentives for research and innovation” (Presidente Della 
Republica Italiana, 2010, n. 76, p. 2).Generally, therefore, performativity was 
organised broadly in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. Effectiveness 
was further framed partially around a managed peer-review process, and 
partially around frequent references to international standards: 
 
• […] definition of quality standards recognised at the international level” (Presidente 
Della Republica Italiana, 2010, n. 76, p. 10); 
• evaluation of the results at an international level (Parlamento Italiano, 2009, n. 1, p. 
2);  
• The activities of the Agency [center on] its insertion in the international context of the 
University evaluation, and research activities are assessed regularly by committees of 
international experts appointed by the Minister also based on designations of 
European organizations in the sector. (Parlamento Italiano, 2009, n. 1, p. 2) 
 
As shown in these examples, international standards and comparisons were 
priorities built into VQR the policy itself. This emphasis on international 
competitiveness and comparisons was equally clear in the policies guiding the 
process for identifying the expert panels that conducted the peer review during 
the VQR.  
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Moreover, policy documents from the Italian Ministry of Instruction, 
Universities and Research (MIUR) also highlighted “ability to attract 
competitive international and federal funding” as a criterion for evaluating the 
quality of research productivity in universities and private research institutes 
that receive public funding (MIUR Linee Guida VQR 2011-2014, p. 3). This 
dovetails with our final theme.  
 
Partnerships and Privatisation 
One aspect of the VQR particularly relevant to our analysis is the “third 
mission’’, which highlights several issues related to the privatisation of public 
higher education in Italy. The third mission focuses on indicators such as 
‘‘management of intellectual property, business creation [ …] and research-
industry relationships’’ (VQR, 2010, p. 4). As noted above, this section of the 
policy also generally refers to institutions’ ability to “attract private resources” 
and “attract competitive funding internationally” as indicators of quality. This is 
a form of privatisation in that the public support of research is supplanted by 
private support. The extent to which this is happening, in fact, is used as a 
performance indicator in the VQR. 
 
Figure 2 shows a detail from an ANVUR report on the VQR process, focused 
on an overview of the “third mission” section of the VQR. More precisely, 
Figure II shows graphs comparing institutions on two indicators: research 
‘income’ (top) and ‘patents’ (bottom), demonstrating these forms of 
privatisation are inherent in the policy. Moreover, the extract from the report 
illustrates how these performance measures set up a comparison across sectors.  
 
In fact, as Ball (2012) and others have noted, the implied standardisation and 
comparison across public and private sector leads to a conceptual equivalency 
that recognises no specific role for public institutions. Instead, this comparison 
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establishes competition among institutions, regardless of sector, and in turn, 
potentially paves the way to further privatisation. For example, in cases where 
private institutions outperform public institutions on a measure, the implied 
choice would be to reward or fund the private institution, and considerations of 




Figure 3. Extract from ANVUR Report on the VQR (2015) 
 
 
In the case of Italy, therefore, policy discourse is informed by the influence of 
neoliberal frames imposed by the EU and by the national government in the 
wake of university restructuring and budget cuts (c.f. Table 3). Policy 
documents related to the VQR show neoliberal concepts emphasizing 
international mobility and standards as well as performativity. In addition, 
however, resistance from researchers who in some cases boycotted the process, 
and eventual acknowledgement from Brussels that a strong move toward 
marketization of universities would not address pressing problems facing the 
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Italian university system illustrate the ways in which neoliberal concepts were 
challenged in this debate.   
 
Discussion and Implications 
From these analyses, we see that policy makers and others who contributed to 
the policy discourse surrounding PBF in the four case jurisdictions employed 
concepts related to neoliberal economics, in that they:  
● aimed to incentivise institutions to change their priorities;  
● introduced competition to create pseudo-markets for HEIs; 
● emphasised efficiency, performativity, and various avenues for privatisation 
(i.e. rewarding private sources of funding and basing quality impacts on the 
economy); 
● created new markets within HEIs for private sector products and services (i.e. 
consultancy and services to help institutions navigate new accountability 
requirements); 
● involved the private sector in creating, mediating, and implementing policy (i.e.  
Gates, Lumina, CCA, OECD); 
● naturalised marketisation (i.e. by assuming its desirability, conflating it with the 
public good, or portraying it as inevitable). 
 
Through these case studies, we observed not only how policymakers used 
neoliberal concepts, as described by Mudge (2008) and others, in forming PBF 
policies. We also saw how this use played out differently in four distinct 
contexts. Both US examples, but especially Washington, showed the centrality 
of policy intermediating organisations (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2012). The 
Tennessee case highlighted how complex, participatory processes had 
developed over time, so that the use of neoliberal concepts was selectively taken 
up within institutions, as well as by external policy makers. Somewhat 
similarly, the UK policy debates demonstrated Feller’s (2009) point, showing 
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that privatisation (i.e. consulting, increased reliance on tuition and emphasis on 
impact) was advocated and implemented both via external pressures and from 
within institutions as well. In Italy, this kind of buy-in unfolded differently, as 
some participants challenged neoliberal solutions. At the same time, however, 
the policy discourse surrounding the VQR also illustrated how performativity 
can reinforce the legitimation of public funding going to private entities (Ball, 
2012). 
 
Our findings raise questions regarding the underlying purposes and 
effectiveness of PBF policies and highlight the importance of incorporating 
responsiveness to the diverse missions and local contexts of institutions. 
Institutions will be more or less constrained in their ability to respond to 
performance-based funding, according to the specific level of autonomy they 
have within the broader system.  
 
If performance-based funding policies rely too simplistically on neoliberal 
frames, they may fail to account for differences across the institutions affected. 
This kind of approach may give rise to unintended consequences, such as 
increasing retention or graduation rates simply by making admissions criteria 
more selective or by diminishing academic expectations placed upon students 
(Arum and Roksa, 2011; Tandberget al., 2014; Letizia, 2015). Moreover, some 
institutions may be forced to bear an unfair and punitive burden, whereby 
resources are progressively more constrained through PBF, creating a 
downward spiral. Some policy analyses have noted that institutions with the 
greatest institutional wealth, high levels of private funding for research and 
other diverse resources, on the other hand, are less likely to feel the 
consequences of receiving or losing public funding tied to outcomes (Dougherty 
and Reddy, 2011; Tandberg and Hillman, 2014). This study thus, highlights the 
ways in which policies that appear neutral in applying measures across 
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institutions may actually place a greater burden upon institutions that have 
fewer resources and that serve the broadest population of students. 
 
More centrally, however, this study explored how neoliberal concepts were used 
by participants in the discourse surrounding four different PBF policies. We 
found that neoliberal concepts were used most often in connection with 
statements of the purpose of the policies. In those contexts, the effectiveness of 
the policies to achieve their goals were assumed (i.e. not made provisionally, in 
light of the lack of firm evidence from studies conducted so far (Hillman, et al., 
2015). Neoliberal concepts were less prevalent or more diluted in descriptions 
of implementation. When more attention to the variation in institutional context 
was apparent, references to equity and the public good were more prevalent. 
Nevertheless, regardless of such contexts, concepts related to equity, service, 
and the public good were scarce, arguably crowded out by the market logic.  
 
The benefit of highlighting these uses is to show “cracks in the wall”; places 
where the use of neoliberal concepts is less prevalent or more open to question 
within the discourse, as well as where they are widely used or deeply assumed. 
The next steps following from these conclusions are: to examine the additional 
ways neoliberalism is shaping our policy debates; to explore the extent to which 
this prevents us from dedicating resources to equity, education for the public 
good, and accountability to communities (not markets); and finally, to identify 
opportunities to introduce equity and extension aims, as well as accountability 
to communities, into policy and practice (Santos, 2006). 
 
Illuminating the role of neoliberal economics in PBF debates is useful because it 
provides an empirical basis for linking those debates to broader theoretical 
discussions about neoliberalism (Santos, 2006; Mudge, 2008), allowing us to 
make use of observations, strategies, and cautions, in navigating debates on 
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current and emerging PBF policies. While the link with neoliberal economics 
may seem intuitive in the context of some policy environments, in the US it is 
not a common or assumed part of the policy debate.  
 
Grounded in social theory, this study illuminates the role performance-based 
funding policies play internationally in moving higher education institutions 
closer to markets. Moreover, it provides an empirical view of the mechanisms 
and networks built into policy debates on performance-based funding. Finally, it 
contributes to a theoretically and empirically grounded view on the discursive 
uses of neoliberalism in education policy.  
 
In the wake of recent global economic crises, it is clear that discussions of 
neoliberal policy in education are as timely as ever. This research contributes 
actionable insights for institutions and scholars, shedding light on the features of 
current and emerging neoliberal discourse that often prevent us, as subjects in 
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Appendix  
 
Tennessee Washington UK Italy Total
Primary Policy Documents 2 1 17 7 27
Advocacy Documents 12 2 7 9 30
Evaluation Studies 3 7 3 7 20
News and Outreach 9 19 9 7 44
Totals 26 29 36 30 121
Table 1. Document Data Set by Case and Type
Note: In addition to extensive activity in the mainstream news media the UK REF was 
discussed extensively on social media. Twitter entries that included the #REF2014 tag 
were digested and included as a single long document. Very brief news stories collected 
via LexisNexis were similarly compiled into a single long document. 
Table 2. Code List





Educational equity or opportunity
Evaluation studies of PBF policies
Funding model
Participatory processes
Performance measures (definitions, etc.)
Public good
References to accountability movements
References to differences in institutional missions or contexts
References to open access institutions
References to research-universities
Remedial developmental courses
Stated purpose of PBF
Transfer-Articulation
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